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SECURITIES REGULATION-SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934-SECTION 10(B)-SECONDARY LIABILITY-AIDING AND
ABETTING-The United States Supreme Court held that there is

no cause of action for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
Central Bank, Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
Central Bank of Denver ("Central Bank") served as indenture
trustee for $26 million in bonds issued by the Colorado Springs-

Stetson Hills Public Building Authority (the "Authority") for
public improvements at the Stetson Hills development.' The
Authority issued $15 million of the bonds in 1986, secured by
landowner assessment liens covering 250 acres of the development.2 In 1988, the Authority issued an additional $11 million
in bonds secured by approximately 272 acres.' The bond covenants required the developer, AmWest, to demonstrate annually
that the land was worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding
principal and interest.'
In January of 1988, AmWest sent Central Bank an updated

appraisal of the land securing the 1986 bond issue.' The senior
underwriter of the 1986 bonds sent Central Bank a letter calling
for an independent appraisal of the land because it appeared
that the 160% test was not being met.6 Correspondence between

1. Central Bank, Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114
S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1994). An indenture trustee holds legal title to trust property and
must carry out the terms of the indenture. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (6th ed.
1990). Stetson Hills is a residential and commercial development in Colorado
Springs. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443.
2. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 893 (10th
Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom, Central Bank, Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
3. First Interstate, 969 F.2d at 893.
4. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443. This requirement was referred to as the
160% test. Id. The bond covenants referred to a bulk sale, liquidation value appraisal. Brief for Respondents, at 2, Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (No. 92-854).
5. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443. This appraisal included an assessment
of the land that was the proposed security for the 1988 bonds. Id.
6. Id. Although property values in Colorado Springs were declining, the 1988
appraisal was essentially unchanged from the 1986 appraisal. Id.

1053

Duquesne Law Review

1054

Vol. 33:1053

Central Bank and AmWest resulted in a postponement of the
independent appraisal until the end of 1988.' The Authority
defaulted on the 1988 bonds and litigation followed.'
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., had invested $2.1 mil-,
lion in the 1988 bond issue? First Interstate Bank subsequently
sued the Authority, the underwriters, an AmWest investor and
director, and Central Bank, under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act") in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.'" Defendant Central Bank moved for summary judgment." The court
granted Central Bank's motion on the grounds that recklessness
did not establish sufficient scienter' 2 to support an aiding and
abetting claim under Section 10(b) absent an independent duty
to disclose.13 The bondholders then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 4
The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment." The court addressed the bondholder's aider-and-abettor
claim against Central Bank under Section 10(b) of the Act"
7.
8.
9.
10.
seeks to

Id. The closing on the 1988 bond issue occurred in June of 1988. Id.
Id.
Id. Jack Naber, an individual, was an additional investor and plaintiff. Id.
First Interstate, 969 F.2d at 893. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
"promote investor protection and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets" through disclosure. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 1
(1989).
11. Brief for Petitioner, at 8, Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (No. 92-854). The
Authority defaulted in the litigation and the bondholders settled their claims with
the underwriters of the 1988 bonds. First Interstate, 969 F.2d at 893. Pring moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that he was not a controlling person under
Section 20(a) of the Act. Id. at 896. Section 20(a) provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision' of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988).
12. In regard to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, scienter refers to "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1345 (6th ed. 1990).
13. Brief for Petitioner, at 8.
14. First Interstate, 969 F.2d at 891.
15. Id. at 893.
16. Id. at 898. Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any.
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
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and held that liability as an aider or abettor existed only when
the plaintiff had established the following: 1) a primary violation
of the Act by another actor; 2) knowledge of the violation by the
aider and abettor; and 3) substantial assistance by the aider and
abettor to the primary violator. 7 In determining what constituted a violation of the Act, the court asserted that recklessness
was sufficient scienter even when there was no independent
duty to disclose. 8 Applying its holding to the facts of the case,
the court determined that a trier of fact could have reasonably
concluded that the postponement of the independent review by
Central Bank constituted substantial assistance to the primary
violator."9 The court decided that the district court erred in
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of
whether an implied cause of action for aiding and abetting violations existed under Section 10(b) of the Act, and if so, whether
recklessness constituted sufficient scienter to impose liability for
such violations.2 '
The Court began its analysis with an overview of the Securities Act of 193322 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
According to the Court, the statutes imposed liability through
the administrative actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and through the express and implied private
rights of action contained in the statutory provisions.2 4
The Court focused on the conduct proscribed by Section 10(b)

contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
17. First Interstate, 969 F.2d at 898.
18. Id. at 903.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 904.
21. Central Bank, 114 S.Ct. at 1443; see Central Bank, Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993) (granting certiorari).
22. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77bbbb (1988).
23. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of
the Court. Id.
24. Id. at 1445. The general anti-fraud provision is contained in Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, and its corollary, Rule 10b-5, was adopted by the commission in
1942. Id. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange . .. (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
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and the civil liability for violations.2" The Court explained that
the determination of liability required the Court to infer congressional intent because the cause of action was implied.2" The
Court then noted its strict adherence to the language of the
statute.27 This strict adherence, the Court maintained, was
evident in previous decisions regarding the scope of prohibited
behavior,28 the construction of other sections in the Act,' and
the construction of similar statutes. 30
The Court acknowledged that its analysis was dependent on
the statutory text of Section 10(b). 3 The Court held that while
the text prohibited manipulation or deception, directly or indirectly, the language was insufficient to create aiding and abetting liability.32 The Court also noted that aiders and abettors
did not themselves engage in any prohibited activity." The
Court determined, therefore, that the language of the statute
indicated that Congress would have included the terms "aid" and
"abet" had Congress intended to impose the liability.'
The Court next explained that even if the text of the statute
was unclear, the Court would have reached the same result by
analyzing the express causes of action set forth in the Act.3"
25. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445.
26. Id. at 1446.
27. Id.
28. Id. Previously, the Court refused to find that Section 10(b) prohibited negligent conduct. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1985). In addition, the Court found that the section did not impose liability for a breach of fiduciary duty absent misrepresentation or failure to disclose. See Sante Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 (1977). Furthermore, the implied cause of action
under the section did not admit liability for a failure to disclose inside information
when trading securities. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980).
29. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1147. For example, the Court had refused to
expand the definition of the word "seller" to include all persons who participated in
the sale under section 12(1) of the Act. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641 (1988).
30. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447. The Court determined that no remedy
was available under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act for knowing participation in fiduciary breach. See Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S. Ct. 2063
(1993).
31. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447.
32. Id. at 1448.
33. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that the directly or indirectly language
was used throughout the text of the statute without implying aiding and abetting
liability. id.
34. Id. In deciding the issue, the Court stated that the merits of imposing aiding and abetting liability were not relevant to the analysis because aiding and abetting was not prohibited by the language of the statute, and the Court refused to
"amend" the statute. Id.
35. Id. The Court used the express causes of action provided by the Act to
define the parameters of the implied right under Section 10(b) in other cases. See
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993);
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
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Because each express cause of action enumerated prohibited
conduct and did not mention aiding and abetting, there was no
inference of congressional intent to impose liability for such
conduct. 6
The Court then rejected other arguments in favor of imposing
aiding and abetting liability.3 7 First, the Court explained that
aiding and abetting liability was not well established in criminal
or tort law when the legislation was enacted, and therefore no
implication of intent could be drawn.8 The Court noted that
there was no general civil aiding and abetting liability statute,
but that Congress had imposed such liability on a statute-bystatute basis.39
The Court then asserted that three possible interpretations
arose from an implication of congressional intent.' The first
was that aiding and abetting liability should attach to all federal
statutes. 41 The Court, however, was unwilling to recognize such
a broad rule in the absence of congressional instruction to do
so." Under the second possible interpretation, congressional
intent could be construed to impose the liability only in regard
to Section 10(b). 43 The Court found no indication in the text of
the statute or in its legislative history that warranted reaching
such a conclusion." The third possible interpretation of implied
congressional intent would impose aiding and abetting liability
throughout the Act, including the express causes of action.'
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
36. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449. The Court found confirmation for this
conclusion from the reliance requirement of corollary Rule 10b-5. Id.

37.

Id.

38. Id. The federal criminal law of aiding and abetting is codified as follows:
"(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,

commands, induces or procures its commission is punishable as a principle." 18
U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988). The Restatement of Torts, imposing aiding and abetting liability
when there is knowledge and substantial assistance, provides that, "Iflor harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to
liability if he . . . . (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(B) (1977).
39. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1451. The Court noted that the Internal Revenue Code, for example, had express aiding and abetting liability. Id. (citing 26
U.S.C. § 6701 (1988)).
40. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1451.
41. Id. Specifically, aiding and abetting would apply regardless of whether or
not the statute contained an explicit provision providing for such liability. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. This interpretation would suggest that while Congress did not imply an
action for aiding and abetting into every statute, there was a cause of action implied
in Section 10(b). Id.
44. Id.
45. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1451.
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The Court rejected this interpretation because it had previously
held that express causes of action in the Act did not create aiding and abetting liability.46
The Court further explained that even if aiding and abetting
liability had been widely accepted in 1934, there was still no
indication that Congress intended it to apply to Section 10(b) of
the Act.4" The Court contended that other forms of secondary
liability were provided for under the Act, indicating that the
omission of aiding and abetting provisions was deliberate."
The Court then asserted that the acquiescence doctrine"9 was
not applicable to this case.5" The Court reasoned that
Congress's failure to amend the statute did not necessarily imply
an approval of judicial interpretation.5 '
The Court then addressed the policy arguments in favor of
imposing aiding and abetting liability. 2 The Court asserted
that policy decisions should be secondary to the statutory text in
interpreting the Act, unless the resulting interpretation was
"bizarre." 3 In addition, the Court noted that policy was not
clearly in favor of imposing the liability, because imposing aiding and abetting liability could create too much uncertainty in a
situation where predictability was valued.' Imposing secondary
liability would also increase litigation costs that would eventually be passed on to the investor." Therefore, the Court surmised
that it was not clear that aiding and abetting liability would
further the purpose of the Act. 6
In the last part of the opinion the Court explained that criminal prohibition did not imply private liability.57 The Court not-

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1452. Congress imposed "controlling person" liability in Section 20 of
the Act. Id. In addition, the Court found another indication that aiding and abetting
liability was purposefully absent in the 1929 Uniform Sale of Securities Act. Id.
49. Acquiescence refers to "conduct recognizing the existence of a transaction,
and intended, in some extent at least, to carry the transaction, or permit it to be
carried, into effect," though it is "not deliberately intended to ratify a former transaction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 24 (6th ed. 1990).
50. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452.
51. Id.

52.

Id. One of the arguments was that the liability would deter people from

contributing to fraudulent schemes and would help to ensure that plaintiffs were
satisfied. Id.
53. Id. (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S. Ct. 599, 604 (1991)).
54. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652

(1988)).
55. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1455 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975)).
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ed that if it did, aiding and abetting liability would apply to
every section of the Act, a conclusion that the Court had already
rejected." Additionally, if civil aiding and abetting liability was
based on the criminal prohibition of such conduct, the civil version would have to require the same intentional mental state as
the criminal prohibition.59 This scienter standard would be inconsistent with the recklessness standard advanced by the
SEC.6" Having rejected the imposition of aiding and abetting
liability, the majority concluded that Central Bank did not engage in any prohibited activity under Section 10(b) of the Act
because it did not manipulate or deceive the investors.61
Justice Stevens authored the dissent, joined by Justices
Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg. 2 The dissent articulated two
major points of contention with the majority.63 Specifically, the
dissenting opinion noted that aiding and abetting liability was
widely recognized," and that the rationale adopted by the majority endangered other established secondary liability in the
Act.65 The dissent contended that any confusion regarding aiding and abetting liability did not apply to the essential structure
of the cause of action,66 and certainly not to its existence.67
Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority for addressing
this issue sua sponte" because the petitioner had assumed the
existence of aiding and abetting liability and questioned only

58. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. The dissent cited the following cases: Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992); K & S Partnership v. Continental Bank,
N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Levin v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478,
1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496 (4th Cir. 1991); Fine v.
American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990); Schlifke v. Seafirst
Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477,
1480 (11th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Moore v. Frost, 107 S. Ct. 3231 (1987); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc.,
700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); IIT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980);
Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978).
65. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Secondary liability under the Act also included conspiracy and respondeat superior liability. Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934,
69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 88 (1980).
66. The appellate courts have generally used the Restatement (Second) of
Torts formula to define the cause of action. See note 38 for the text of the Restatement test.
67. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Sua sponte is Latin for "of his or its own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
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whether recklessness established sufficient scienter 5 The dissent further noted that narrow interpretation was not always
consistent with judicial restraint.7"
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 were adopted in response to the stock market crash of
1929.71 The intent of the statutes was to provide a level playing
field for investors with as little damage to legitimate business as
possible.72 This was to be established by promoting fair dealing,7" disclosure, and business ethics.74 Section 10(b) was to be
used as the general anti-fraud provision. 5
Recognition of a cause of action under Section 10(b) began in
1946 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 76 In Kardon, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to induce them to sell
corporate stock for much less than the stock was worth.77 The
court considered whether a violation of the provisions of Section
10(b) resulted in civil liability.7" The court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss,7" and held that the recovery of
damages resulting from the violation of a statute was a fundamental remedy."0 Because the violation of a statutory provision

69. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1460. The dissent concluded that it would have been more prudent
to uphold "rights of action recognized for decades," even when the jurisprudence that
created them was no longer fashionable. Id.
71. STEINBERG, cited at note 10, at 1. See also Elizabeth Sager, Note, The Recognition of Aiding and Abetting in the Federal Securities Laws, 23 Hous. L. REV.
821, 831 (1986).
72. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933) (stating that "[t]he purpose
of the legislation I suggest, is to protect the public with the least possible interference to honest business").
73. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933).
74. See S. REP. No. 47, at 6-7 ("This proposal adds to the ancient rule of
caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of
telling the whole truth on the seller," further stating that there should be "legislation to correct unethical and unsafe practices on the part of officers and directors of
banks and other corporations."). But see Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels,
Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637,
656 (1988) (noting that "[iun sum, however, the legal history is inconclusive .. .and
can be read either way depending on the reader's proclivities").
75. See Michael J. Kaufmann, A Little "Right" Musick: The Unconstitutional
Judicial Creation of Private Rights of Action under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 287 (1994).

76. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
77. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513. The defendants allegedly misrepresented that
there were no negotiations pending to sell the assets of the corporation. Id. at 514.
78. Id. at 513. The court stated that "it is not, and cannot be, questioned"
that the complained of conduct was a violation of Section 10(b). Id.
79. Id. Defendants also questioned the court's personal jurisdiction. Id.
80. Id. at 514. The court relied on the Restatement of Torts, and the maxim,
ubi jus ibi remedium. Id. at 513. The Restatement provides:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing
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resulted in tort liability, the court opined that if the legislature
should choose to withhold a civil remedy for violation of a statutory provision, its intent to do so had to be clear.8 The court
reasoned that a failure to expressly impose liability was not
sufficient to overcome general tort principles implying a cause of
action.82 Applying the Restatement test, the court found that
the plaintiffs were members of the class the statute was intended to benefit." Therefore, the court concluded that the allegations of a violation of Section 10(b) presented a cause of action
for which relief could be granted."
. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel 5 plaintiff stockholders alleged
fraud and violation of fiduciary duty in relation to a proposed

merger rejected by the president-and majority stockholder of the
defendant corporation. 6 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 10(b) because they misrepresented the
reasons for the failed merger and failed to disclose both the
selling price and the plan to use the facility as a captive source
of steel.87 The issue was whether a plaintiff who was not a purchaser or seller of a security had a cause of action under Section
10(b).8s
The court held that a plaintiff had to have status as a purchaser or seller to bring the cause of action. 8 The court reasoned that the adoption of Rule 10b-5 closed the fraud loophole
of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act by allowing recovery to defraud-

to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of
another if; (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect
an interest of the other as an individual; and (b) the interest invaded is one
which the enactment is intended to protect ....
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1939). Ubi jus ibi remedium means "where there is a
right, there is a remedy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990).
81. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514.
82. Id. at 513. The court defined Section 286 of the Restatement as "more
than merely a canon of statutory interpretation. The disregard of the command of a
statute is a wrongful act and a tort." Id. at 514.
83. Id. at 514. The court noted that the investors were the intended protected
class and applied the term liberally. Id.
84.

Id. at 515.

85. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
86. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 462. Feldmann was president and chair of the
board of directors. Id. He owned 40% of the common stock, and the rest was held
by small investors. Id. Although potentially very profitable to Newport stockholders,
the merger was rejected and instead, the president sold his shares to another company at a premium price. Id. The purchasers wished to use the facility as a "captive" source of steel, which explained the unusually high price. Id.
87. Id. In a letter to the stockholders, the president stated that negotiations
broke down due to the "uncertain international situation." Id.
88. Id. at 462-63.
89. Id. at 463. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to
state a claim, Id. at 464.
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ed sellers, as well as defrauded purchasers." The court opined
that it was this limited purpose, and not a desire to expand
liability, that prompted the adoption of the rule.9' The court
concluded that while a broad purpose of the Act was to protect
investors from the abuse of corporate insiders, Section 10(b) was
not the congressionally chosen means to achieve that purpose. 2
Recognition of a claim for aiding and abetting as a violation of
Section 10(b) first occurred in Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Insurance Co.9" In Brennan, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant aided and abetted the illegal activities of a brokerage
firm by failing to report the firm to the Commission. 4 The complaint alleged that the brokerage firm lied to the purchasers
about delays in the delivery of the stock and that the defendant
corporation's failure to act enhanced its own bargaining position
in regard to potential mergers." The court addressed whether
the civil liability imposed under Section 10(b) included a claim
for aiding and abetting in a violation of the provision."
In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court held
that the admission of aiding and abetting liability was well
grounded in tort law and worked in conjunction with the Kardon
decision.9' The court cited its decision in SEC injunction cases, 98 as well as cases where defendants were liable for substantially assisting the fraud, as precedent for their decision.' Although the legislative history was held inconclusive, 00 the
90. Id. at 463. The court cited an SEC Release as evidence of this intent. Id.
(citing SEC Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942).
91. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463. The court reached a similar conclusion by
comparing the language of the statutes. Id.
92. Id. at 463-64. The court asserted that Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act expressly provided such a remedy, and that the absence of such a provision in Section
10(b) was telling. Id. at 464.
93. 259 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
94. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 675.
95. Id. The brokerage firm failed to deliver stock valued at $2,900,000 because
it was used for speculation "and other improper purposes." Id. The complaint also
alleged that officers of the defendant company personally profited. Id.
96. Id. at 675-76.
97. Id. at 676. The court called aiding and abetting liability "a logical and
natural complement to the Kardon doctrine." id. (citing Knrdon, 69 F. Supp. at 512).
The court admitted, however, that Congress's failure to respond to the judicial creation of the private cause of action in the twenty years since its inception was inconclusive. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 677.
98. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 676-77 (citing SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F.
Supp. 904 (S.D. N.Y. 1959) and SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D.
Cal. 1939)).
99. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 677 (citing Fry v. Schumacker, 83 F. Supp. 476
(E.D. Pa. 1947) and Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D. N.Y.
1963)).
100. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680. The court stated that "to draw any infer-
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court asserted that the absence of an express provision was an
insufficient basis for denying a remedy.'' In formulating a
framework for aiding and abetting liability, the court required a
showing of improper knowledge and substantial assistance."2
The court concluded that aiding and abetting liability was imposed out of concern for fairness and compensation.0 3
The Supreme Court did not address the validity of the Section
10(b) private cause of action until 1971 in Superintendent v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co." 4 In Superintendent, the defendants conspired to manipulate the accounts of the Manhattan
Casualty Company in order to purchase the company with the
company's own assets.'05 The issue before the Court was
whether the fraud was sufficiently "in connection with" the sale
of a security to be actionable under Section 10(b) of the Act.0 6
The Court held that for purposes of Section 10(b), Manhattan
Casualty Company was an investor that was injured as a result
of deceptive practices regarding the sale of securities.' The
Court accepted the lowers courts' development of the Section
10(b) cause of action,'° and called for a flexible interpretation
ence . . . would indeed be a 'venture into speculative unrealities.' " Id.
101. Id. The court stated that, "in absence of a clear legislative expression to
the contrary, the statute must be flexibly applied so as to implement its policies and
purposes." Id. at 680-81.
102. Id. at 680. Improper knowledge and substantial assistance are defined in
the Restatement of Torts, which imposes liability when the actor "knows that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or . . . gives substantial assistance
to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §
876 (1939). The Restatement approach had been followed in the district courts essentially unchanged and with few variations at the time of the Central Bank decision.
See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777-78 (lst Cir. 1983) (requiring
.awareness of role in an improper activity" and "knowing and substantial assistance"); but see Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923 (1991) (requiring a "manipulative or deceptive act" and
scienter).
103. Brennan, 259 U.S. at 680 (citing the Kardon maxim, "where there is a
right, there is a remedy").
104. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
105. Superintendent, 404 U.S. at 8. The respondents sold Manhattan's stock for
$5,000,000. Id. The check for $5,000,000 was from an account with no funds. Id. The
first action of the new president of Manhattan was to sell the corporation's Treasury
Stock and deposit the cash into the previously empty account that the $5,000,000
purchase price was drawn from. Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 7.
106. Id. at 10.
107. Id. at 9-10. That the deception was carried out by an officer, that the
transaction was not through an exchange or over-the-counter market, and that the
proceeds due to the seller were misappropriated were all held to be irrelevant to the
analysis. Id. at 10.
108. Id. at 10 n.7 The Court noted that, "it is now established that a private
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of the statute rather than a restrictive, technical one. 10 9
The Court's presumption in favor of flexible interpretation of
the Act began to change in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,"' where the Court upheld the validity of the Birnbaum
decision.'
In Blue Chip, the plaintiffs claimed that the
company's prospectus was purposefully deceptive in its bleak
appraisal of the company's future so that the shares not sold
could be offered at a later time for greater profit."' The issue
was whether a defrauded plaintiff who had neither purchased
nor sold a security had a cause of action under Section 10(b)." '
In affirming the rule established in Birnbaum,"' the Court
held that the plaintiff had to have the status of a purchaser or
seller in order to have standing to bring an action under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1" The Court declared that any deception
or manipulation by the defendant was not in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. " The Court explained that the
lower courts had long required standing as a purchaser or seller, and also noted that Congress had failed to reject this interpretation for over twenty years." ' In sum, the Court determined that the statutory scheme, while not conclusive, supported the conclusions of the Birnbaum court."19
The Court continued its retraction of the cause of action under
Section 10(b) in Ernst & Ernst v.Hochfelder.2 ° In Ernst, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant corporation had aided and
abetted a fraudulent scheme by a bank employee that induced

right of action is implied under Section 10(b)." Id. at 13 n.9.
109. Id. at 12. Unlike the court of appeals, the Supreme Court determined that
while Section 10(b) was intended to preserve the integrity of the securities market,
it was not limited to that purpose. Id.
110. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Blue Chip Stamps marked the beginning of what was
called the "contraction era" of the Court's interpretation of the Securities law.
Bromberg & Lowenfels, cited at note 74, at 648.
111. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 725. See notes 85-92 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Birnbaum decision.
112. Id. at 726. The prospectus was developed as part of a reorganization plan
whereby retailers who had worked with the old company were offered common stock
in the new company. Id.
113. Id. at 727.
114. See Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 461.
115. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731. The appellate court did not overrule
Birnbaum, but found that an exception was necessary in this case. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. See Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 461.
118. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 732-33.
119. Id. at 731. The Court contrasted Section 10(b) with the 1933 Act's parallel
provision, Section 17(a), which reaches fraud "inthe offer or sale" of securities, as
opposed to Section 10(b)'s "purchase or sale" language. Id. at 733-34.
120. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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investors to deposit their money in escrow accounts which he
successfully converted.'' The Court addressed the issue of
whether Section 10(b) supported an action for negligent conduct.122 The Court determined that scienter was a necessary
element of a Section 10(b) cause of action. 2 ' The Court examined the language of the statute124 and-the legislature's particularized standards of fault in the express causes of action in the
Act.2 5 The Court reviewed the legislative history of the Act,
but noted it was "bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress'
intent."12 The Court reserved the issue of whether an aiding
and abetting claim was valid when the plaintiff proved scien27

ter.1

In Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,1" the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants had obtained a fraudulent appraisal pursuant to a valid Delaware short-form merger. 29 The Court addressed the issue of whether "freezing out" minority stockholders
was manipulative or deceptive under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b5.3 The Court held that a breach of fiduciary duty was not
actionable under the statute as long as there had been adequate
disclosure.' 3 ' The Court maintained that even if the language

121. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 189. No escrow accounts existed, and the money was
immediately converted by the employee. Id. He committed suicide in 1968. Id. Respondents alleged that the corporation would have discovered the scheme if their
auditing procedures were more thorough; specifically, a thorough audit would have
revealed the employee's rule that no one could open mail addressed to him, even in
his absence. Id. at 190.
122. Id. at 193.
123. Id. See note 12 for the definition of scienter.
124. Id. at 199. The Court asserted that the words "manipulative," "device," and
"contrivance" demanded willful and intentional conduct to constitute a violation. Id.
125. Id. at 200. The Court asserted that the express causes of action required
varying degrees of fault, and therefore the language of the section was paramount.
Id. In dissent, Justice Blackmun noted the Court's "technical consistency." Ernst, 425
U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, he urged the legislature to act with
express protection for the "broad, needed and deserving benefit" of investor victims.
Id. at 218.
126. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201.
127. Id. at 191 n.7.
128. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
129. Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 467. The appraisal valued the minority shareholder's
stock at $125 per share and the shareholders were offered $150 per share. Id. at
466-67. The plaintiffs, however, alleged that when the fair market value of the subsidiary company's physical assets was taken into account, the actual value of the
stock was $772 per share. Id. at 466 n.5. Delaware Corporation Law permitted the
parent corporation to pay minority stockholders cash for their shares in the subsidiary without advance notice or approval. Id. at 465. Under the statute, the minority
shareholders could dispute the terms of the merger by petitioning the Delaware
Court of Chancery. Id.
130. Id. at 474.
131. Id. The Court held that the plaintiffs had the opportunity to either accept
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of the statute was not dispositive of the issue, other factors re-

quired the same result.'32 Specifically, the Court asserted that
no implied cause of action should be recognized that did not
reflect the Act's fundamental purpose of full and fair disclosure.133 Additionally, the Court reasoned that Congress did not
intend to impose liability in areas "traditionally relegated to
state law."'34 The Court concluded that although investors
might need the benefit of federal regulation in this type of merger, Section 10(b) was not intended to provide such relief.135
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,38 the plaintiffs alleged
that during the liquidation of a securities brokerage firm, the
officers concealed losses and falsified financial reports.'37 The
plaintiffs sought relief under an implied cause of action pursuant to Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act on the grounds that the
defendant had breached statutory duties by conducting an improper audit and certification. 3 " The Court asserted that the
issue was whether a cause of action existed under Section
17(a). 39 The Court relied on strict statutory construction and
explained that the use of tort principles to define a statutory
private right of action was misplaced. 4 0 The Court concluded
that finding an implied cause of action in the absence of clear
legislative history was "a hazardous enterprise, at best. " 41' The

the offer or petition the Delaware Court of Chancery. Id. The Court further opined
that the "choice was fairly presented," and "all relevant information" was provided.
Id.
132. Id. at 477.
133. Id. at 477-78 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 396 U.S. 375, 381-85
(1970)).
134. Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 478 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
135. Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 479-80. The Court stated that Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 should not be extended to "cover the corporate universe." Id. at 480
(quoting William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L. J. 663, 700 (1974)).
136. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
137. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 565. In 1973 the officers were enjoined from
conducting business violating the 1934 Act. Id. at 564. Pursuant to the Securities
Investor Protection Act, Redington was appointed trustee in the brokerage firm liquidation. Id. at 565 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1988)).
138. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 566. The plaintiffs also alleged state claims of
negligence, breach of contract and breach of warranty. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that
the audit and certification were improper in reference to the preparation of financial
statements and questionnaires. Id.
139. Id. at 562.
140. Id. at 568. The Court explicitly negated the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium,
holding that an injury arising from the violation of a statute did not automatically
create a private cause of action. Id. (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 688 (1979)).
141. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571.
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Court also looked to the statutory scheme of the Act,142 and determined that the remedial purposes of the Act did not create an
implied cause of action.'
In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,' 4 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations
in a securities registration statement.' 45 The issue was whether the express cause of action in Section 11 of the 1933 Act
barred the plaintiffs from seeking relief under Section 10(b).'4"
The Court held that a Section 10(b) action could be maintained
even if it could also be brought under Section 11 of the 1933
Act. "47
' The Court reasoned that much of the prohibited conduct
under the securities laws would result in multiple violations.'48
Additionally, the Court explained that the scienter requirement
imposed because of the concurrent naunder Section 10(b) was
49
ture of the remedies.'

In Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of
Wausau,"0 shareholders alleged that the stock offering was
materially misleading and therefore was in violation of Sections
11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, and state law.'' The issue was whether a private right of52
action for contribution was appropriate in a 10b-5 action.'
142. Id.
143. Id. at 578. The Court maintained that such purposes were not a justification for ignoring the statutory language and scheme. Id. This supported the Court's
statement in Sante Fe that the Act's purpose was disclosure. Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at
477-78. The Court distinguished its recognition of an implied cause of action under
Section 10(b) in a footnote by asserting that the "Court simply acquiesced" to the
lower court's interpretation. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 577 n.19.
144. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
145. Herman, 459 U.S. at 378. The complaint specifically charged that the costs
incurred in construction and the financial condition of the failed company were concealed. Id.
146. Id. at 381. The Court determined that the defendants might not have been
liable under Section 11 because the defendants contended that they did not prepare
or certify some of the statements in question. Id. at 381 n.11.
147. Id. at 387.
148. Id. at 383. (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778 (1979) (applying "Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act to conduct also prohibited by Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act")). The Court further held that Congress explicitly provided that the
remedies created would be supplemented by "any and all" additional remedies.
Herman, 459 U.S. at 383.
149. Herman, 459 U.S. at 383, 384. In Ernst, the Court held that allowing negligent conduct under Section 10(b) would enable plaintiffs to circumvent the scienter
requirement in the express cause of action. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210. This potential
circumvention assumed that either remedy was available. Herman, 459 U.S. at 384.
150. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
151. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2086. The shareholders settled their claim for $13.5
million, and the insurers for the named defendants brought an action for contribution under Rule 10b-5 against the attorneys and accountants. Id. The respondents
had funded $13 million of the $13.5 million settlement. Id.
152. Id. The parties had not questioned the existence of the right to contribu-
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The Court opined that it had to discern the intent of the 1934
Congress in order to promote consistency within the Act.153 In
making this determination of intent, the Court contended that
the language of the statute yielded no answer.6 4 The Court
therefore looked to the express causes of action in the Act that
had the same purpose and operation as the implied cause of
action sought. 5' The Court began its search with the language
of the statute, and considered the statute as a whole in its analysis.15

This overview illustrates that since 1975 the Supreme Court
has generally curtailed the lower courts' more expansive reading
of Section 10(b).'57 The* Supreme Court's rationale in Central
Bank, therefore, was not surprising.1"' The implied cause of
action has its roots in an application of general tort principles 5' that has now been shunned as an inappropriate guidepost in statutory interpretation. 6 ° An emphasis on the Act's
remedial purpose16"' has been narrowed to include only the duty to disclose.'62 Furthermore, lower court precedent has become less significant and instead, the Court has focused on the
statutory language and scheme,
including the express causes of
63
action set forth in the Act.1

It is this express cause of action theory that the Court relied
on in Musick.64 The inclusion of a right to contribution in the
express causes of action in the Act, and the absence of aiding
and abetting in those actions, may explain the different outcomes in the cases.' 6 However, while the Court in Central
Bank cites this rationale in support of its decision, it clearly pronounced that it is secondary to the analysis of the statutory
language.' 6 It seems inconsistent that the express cause of ac-

tion, but had disputed the means of determining the share of liability. Id.
153.. Id. at 2089-90.
154. Id.
155. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091. The Court likened contribution under 10b-5 to
Section 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act which recognized a right to contribution. Id. (citing
15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b)).
156. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2090-91.
157. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, cited at note 74, at 648.
158. Professor Fischel predicted the demise of all forms of secondary liability in
1980. Fischel, cited at note 65, at 82.
159. See Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514; Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680.
160. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
161. See Superintendent, 404 U.S. at 12.
162. See Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 477.
163. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448; Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091.
164. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091.
165. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448; Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2091.
166. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
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tion analysis was the primary rationale in Musick and is only
secondary in Central Bank. At the same time, the statutory
language that was deemed inconclusive in Musick. 7 resolved
the question in Central Bank.16
Had the Musick Court applied the rationale of Central Bank,
decided just one year later, it would have had to refuse to recognize the right of contribution. Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in Musick pointed out that a strict construction of the statutory text did not support a right to contribution.'69 He further
suggested that the express causes of action in the Act were not
dispositive, noting, like the majority in Central Bank, that Congress was perfectly capable of creating whatever causes of action
it wanted. 70
The Musick decision is important to an analysis of Central
Bank because the inconsistent results highlight the determinative role of public policy, over the Court's protests that the decisions are based on strict statutory construction. In Musick, the
Court declared that it would be unfair to limit the defendant's
right to contribution. 7 ' In Central Bank, however, the Court
noted the possibility of "vexatious" litigation pursuant to an
aiding and abetting cause of action.'72
This kind of commentary by the Court was inappropriate if, in
fact, the decision was truly one of statutory construction. When
enumerating the Court's decisions engaging in strict statutory
construction, the decision in Musick was notably absent and was
not cited until the discussion of its "secondary" analysis of the
express causes of action.'
Therefore, policy considerations,
which the Court professes are not at issue, appear to be controlling in both Musick and Central Bank.
Whatever the Court's underlying motivations, the question of
the decision's impact remains to be seen. Although the Court in
Central Bank insisted that it was Congress's duty to legislate,
Section 10(b) analysis has developed without Congressional
action and will continue to do so.' The dissent in Central
Bank explained that the decision implicated other secondary

167.

See Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2090.

168. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446.
169. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2092 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. Id. See also Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449.
171. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2090-91.
172. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454.
173. Id. at 1448. See note 28 for the cases cited as engaging in strict statutory
construction.
174. See also David S. Ruder, The Future of Aiding and Abetting and Rule lob.
5 After Central Bank of Denver, 49 BUSINESS LAW. 1479, 1487 (1994).
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liability such as respondeat superior and conspiracy liability,175
and other commentators agree. 17' The decision also makes it
unlikely that the SEC will be able to bring aiding and abetting
actions. 7' The decision therefore questions all forms of secondary liability, and in doing so, makes the distinction between
primary and secondary liability a crucial one.'78
The circuits differ in their interpretations of the theoretical
distinction between primary and secondary liability,' 9 and
Central Bank makes the distinction a matter of great practical
importance. In most circuits, liability is determined by the
defendant's actions in relation to the alleged manipulative or
deceptive act. Plaintiffs in these circuits will most likely continue to seek relief from peripheral actors like accountants, attorneys, and financial institutions, by claiming that they acted
"directly." The success of such claims remains to be seen.
In the Seventh Circuit, however, secondary actors are determined not by their relationship to the fraud, but by their relationship to the statute's provisions. 80 In this theoretical framework, the elimination of aiding and abetting liability eliminates
the liability of whole groups of actors, including attorneys, that
are not liable under some other express provision of the Act. It
is important to note, however, that the Seventh Circuit's aiding
and abetting test required the defendant to engage in a manipulative or deceptive act."' Under most circuit's theoretical
framework, this would be a primary violation of the Act. It is
possible, then, that the Supreme Court could have achieved the

175.

Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

176.

See Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 BUSINESS LAW.

1429, 1434-35 (1994)
177. Seligman, cited at note 176, at 1435.
178. See Lisa Klein Wagner & John E. Failla, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. - The Beginning of an End Or Will Less Lead
to More? 49 BUSINESS LAW. 1451, 1456 (1994).
179. See Mary T. Doherty, Note, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, 25 IND.
L. REV. 829, 837-40 (1991) (comparing Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.
1988); DMI Furniture, Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co., 644 F. Supp. 1517 (C.D. Cal.
1986) and Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.
1986)).
180. Barker, 797 F.2d at 494-95. Doherty notes:
Thus, the Seventh Circuit distinguishes primary and aiding and abetting liability based on the role played by the defendant within the securities laws
statutory scheme. This contrasts with the other circuits which distinguish
primary from secondary liability based chiefly on the role the defendant played
in the primary violator's fraudulent scheme.
Doherty, cited at note 179, at 840.
181. Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1317 (1991) (holding that an aider and abettor must commit a
prohibited act with the same scienter required of primary violators).
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same result by adopting the Seventh Circuit's aiding and abetting test."8 2 Furthermore, those who are concerned about their
potential liability after Central Bank may find guidance by determining their liability under the manipulative or deceptive
practice requirement of the Seventh Circuit's test."13
In conclusion, while the rationale in Central Bank is inexorably logical, it is not as straightforward as it appears. The decision appears to have been motivated not by the textualist concerns enunciated by the Court, but by simple policy considerations. An analysis of the cases show that textualism can serve
the Court's policy purposes as well as a more openly result-oriented jurisprudence. Litigation under Section 10(b) may well
have earned the description "vexatious,""4 but this author
notes, as the Court does not, that Central Bank acted unethically and escaped responsibility. In its discussion of policy arguments, the Court opined that it was not clear that aiding and
abetting liability furthered the purposes of the Act because of
the uncertainty that it might create.8 ' Additionally, it has
been argued that "an award of damages under the securities
laws is not the way to blaze the trail toward improved ethical
standards."" 6 Nonetheless, it is doubtful that Congress intended to create a stable securities market by tolerating unethical
business practices.
JoErin O'Leary

182. It has been argued that "the Seventh Circuit's test suggests that its theory
of aiding and abetting liability is not truly a secondary liability theory at all."
Doherty, cited at note 179, at 844.
183. The test requires a primary violation, a manipulative or deceptive practice
committed to aid the primary violation, and scienter. Robin, 915 F.2d at 1123.
184. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454.
185. Id.
186. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th
Cir. 1986) (stating that "[tihe securities law therefore must lag behind changes in
ethical and fiduciary standards").

